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THE CONFUCIAN PUZZLE:
JUSTICE AND CARE IN AQUINAS
AUDRA GOODNIGHT
ABSTRACT: Ethical theories of justice and care are often presented in opposition to each
other. Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas’s moral theory has the resources to bring justice
and care together. There is, however, a potential worry for her view raised by the ‘Confucian
Puzzle’. The puzzle poses a moral dilemma between care and justice that serves as a test case
for Stump’s picture. In this paper, I provide a brief overview of the justice and care debate
along with the subsequent challenges that both positions face in order to situate Aquinas’s
position as Stump defends it. Next, I present the Confucian Puzzle and consider how Aquinas
might respond to it. Finally, given his response, I make two claims. First, the unifying virtue
of charity enables Aquinas to resolve the tension between justice and care as it appears in the
Confucian Puzzle. Second, Stump’s integration thesis only obtains given what Aquinas says
about charity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ethical theories of justice and care1 are often presented in opposition to each other.
Eleonore Stump (2003) argues that Aquinas’s moral theory has the resources to bring
justice and care together. Stump presents a plausible picture of how care and justice
come together in Aquinas; however, one may wonder how this picture holds up when
tested. There is a potential worry for her view raised by a story found in Analects
13.18 of Confucius. The ‘Confucian Puzzle’ poses an apparent moral dilemma
between care and justice that serves as a test case for Stump’s thesis. This paper
explores how Aquinas might respond to this moral dilemma.
In what follows, I provide a brief overview of the justice and care debate along
with the subsequent challenges that face both positions. This discussion situates
________________________
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Henceforth I use ‘care theories’ and ‘justice theories’ interchangeably with ‘ethic of care’ and ‘ethic
of justice’.
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Stump’s defense of Aquinas’s ethical theory. Next, I present the Confucian Puzzle
and consider how Aquinas might respond to it. Finally, given his response, I reach
two conclusions. First, the unifying virtue of charity enables Aquinas to resolve the
apparent tension between justice and care in the Confucian Puzzle. Second, Stump’s
integration thesis only obtains given what Aquinas says about charity.
1.1 PRELININARY REMARKS
In what follows, I will understand theories of care and theories of justice in a general
way rather than ascribing to one particular theory. Typically, theories that privilege
justice include deontological, consequential, and virtue ethical theories, which also
represent the main Western ethical traditions. Clearly, these theories espouse different
core theses regarding moral principles, what constitutes a moral action, and who
counts as a moral person. What is important to note for our purposes is not the
differences but rather the similarities in these views: their focus on independent,
impartial, and autonomous rational individuals and the various moral constraints
necessary for just interaction with others. Because the principles of impartiality and
autonomy are emphasized at the exclusion of close relationships, they are criticized
for being overly impartial.
In contrast, theories that privilege care and care relations generally prioritize the
other person more than the individual person. Relations of care between self and other
are the focus of ethical deliberation such that moral actions take into account
particular persons and emphasize the importance of sustaining care relations between
persons. Care occurs within concrete situations and in the context of particular
relationships. The feelings of care, tenderness, concern, and love are what informs
moral decisions. Nevertheless, care can also be an instance of tough love, which
might include a parent who refuses to give a child the chocolate he asks for because
he is allergic to it. Because theories of care acknowledge the importance, even
priority, of close relationships, they are often criticized for being overly partial. Prima
facie they also risk sacrificing the individual’s good for the good of others with whom
she relates.
With this rough construal in mind, I will refer to theories of justice and care in
ways that draw upon these basic distinctions in order to make headway on the
particular question of this paper, namely, does Aquinas successfully integrate justice
and care in his ethical system as Stump argues?
2.

STUMP’S PROPOSAL: INTEGRATION THESIS

Many care theorists challenge the prominent individualism of traditional Western
ethical theories of justice. 2 As Ornaith O’Dowd explains, “Many philosophical
interpretations of care have had as a significant component a critique of abstract,
universal principles, which are usually identified with ‘justice ethics’…[where]
2

See e.g., Virginia Held (2006); Nel Noddings (1982); Carol Gilligan (1982).
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‘justice ethics’ denotes canonical Western ethical theories based on universal rules or
principles” (2012, 407). Some frequent criticism of justice theories include the
exclusive priority placed on equality, fairness, and the autonomy of each individual
person often to the exclusion of maintaining relationships and meeting the needs of
others, which arguably is a vital part of ethical life (Clement 1996, 14). The challenge
for defenders of justice theories is “to show how one’s obligations to others arise
without violating one’s individual autonomy” (Clement 1996, 13).
In contrast, the challenges for defenders of care theories are to show both how
prioritizing relationships of care and concern for particular others does not exploit the
care-giver and how there is a healthy balance of giving preference to loved ones
without neglecting the needs of more distant others. For example, Nel Noddings’
early work Caring is often criticized for emphasizing the care for close loved ones at
the exclusion of distant others. Her account also risks losing sight of the individual in
the care relation by characterizing care as a kind of “engrossment” in the other
(Sander-Staudt 2011).3 Thus, there seems to be an impasse between justice and care.
Either you prioritize fair, impartial treatment to all without prioritizing close
relationships; or you privilege the importance of maintaining close relationships with
loved ones at the sacrifice of justice and personal desires.
Annette Baier criticizes Aquinas’s ethics for proposing “a very legalistic moral
theory” that objectionably privileges the individual good, proposes impartial laws at
the expense of particular needs, and shows minimal concern for the common good
(Baier 1995, 54; Stump 2003, 310). In response to critics like Baier, Stump argues
that Thomistic ethics can integrate both justice and care into its system. It is
structured on virtues, not laws or rules, and his account of justice reveals great
concern for the poor and the common good of others (Stump 2003, 311).
Stump notes that Aquinas’s ethical system is founded on a personal and
essentially relational notion of ‘the good,’ namely God, rather than an abstract
conception of ‘the good.’4 So, she says, “Aquinas supposes that caring of certain sorts
is integral to justice itself…[it is] morally obligatory to relieve the needs of the poor
and the poor have a right to the things necessary for life, such as food, clothing, and
shelter” (Stump 3002, 311). By suggesting that caring of sorts is integral to justice,
Stump aims to show how Aquinas’s ethics transcends the worries faced by both care
and justice theories.5 Before challenging Stump’s integration thesis, it is helpful to
consider what Aquinas says about justice and care.
3

See also Nel Noddings (1982).
The notion of Aquinas’s ethics being founded on the good, which is God, is fundamental to his
ethics. Because Aquinas thinks that being and goodness are correlative, and that God is both Being and
a being, it follows that God is goodness; thus, He is the foundation of all reality and morality. Stump
argues that the metaphysics of goodness actually provides a meta-ethical foundation for Aquinas’s
ethics (62). I will not attempt to explore or defend this important claim here, since it exceeds the scope
of the present paper topic; but, for a detailed argument see Chapter 2: “Goodness” in Stump (2003).
See also Stump (2016).
5
Stump cites Thomas Nagel’s concern about the apparent irreconcilability of the personal (selffocused) and impersonal (other-focused) standpoint in ethics. Whichever theory one defends will face
4
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2.1 JUSTICE
Aquinas holds a particular kind of virtue ethics that resembles, but essentially departs
from, Aristotelian virtue ethics.6 The virtues divide into three categories for Aquinas,
namely moral, intellectual, and theological virtues. Justice is a moral virtue that
relates persons to each other and divides into distributive and commutative justice (ST
II.II q. 61 a. 1).7 For Aquinas, justice is a matter of equality with respect to different
kinds of transactions between persons (ST II.II q. 57 a. 1).8 These transactions may
involve economic exchanges of goods or they may involve relational interactions
between persons. For example, if Sam gossips about Mary, he has taken something
from her, e.g., reputation, and commutative justice requires that he make amends with
her to restore equality, e.g., by apologizing. Since justice is a kind of equality, it
follows that injustice is a sort of inequality.9 Aquinas maintains that a sufficiently
grave act of injustice, or moral wrongdoing, actually breaks a person’s relation with
God and can threaten an agent’s salvation if it is not made right. Until the wrong is
rectified, it remains an injustice (Stump 2003, 319).
Aquinas places significant moral demand on individuals for the sake of the
common good, which he includes under justice. As he says,
Justice … directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways:
first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others
in general…[the good of any virtue] is referable to the common good, to which justice
directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the
common good. (ST II-II q. 58 a. 5)

the challenge of accounting for the individual’s good and the good of others. When care and justice
conflict, it is not clear to Nagel how these two viewpoints can be reconciled in a satisfactory way. It
seems, to him, that a theory will always end up defending either the personal or impersonal standpoint
and this result follows from the lack of an acceptable ideal in current ethical systems. [See Stump
(2003, 312-13) for a nice summary of this worry and also Nagel (1991).]
6
In this paper, I assume the non-Aristotelian character of Aquianas’s ethics since this is the view
defended by Stump, whose argument is the focus of my criticism. For a more thorough argument for
the non-Aristotelian character of Aquinas’s ethics, see Stump (2011, 29-43). See also Pinsent (2013)
for a detailed account of the second-person in Aquinas’s virtue ethics and see Dahm (2015) for a
critique of Stump’s view.
7
All translations of the Summa Theologica are taken from the Fathers of the English Dominican
Province, www.newadvent.org and are cited as part, question, article.
8
Distributive justice involves relations between an individual and the state. Commutative justice
involves relations between individuals within a state. In distributive justice, equality is determined by
the geometrical mean and requires fair distribution between parties. In commutative justice, equality is
determined by the arithmetical mean or equal quantity of goods.
9
Aquinas says, “even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so too the object of
injustice is something unequal” (ST II.II q. 59 a. 2 ad. 1).
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‘The common good’ is the good of the whole society in which individuals are related
as part to whole. Aquinas explains that the end of the law is common good and that
laws such as “do not steal” are framed not only for the individual person’s benefit but
also for the benefit of the whole society. The common good can also be understood as
an aspect of the good and a kind of formal moral norm under which
individual members of a society fall (DeCrane 2010, 58).10
Accordingly, Aquinas thinks human persons are intrinsically social and are
“obligated to do ‘whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society,’”
which includes preserving human flourishing, not mere human existence (DeCrane
2010, 59-60). Justice, then, concerns not only the individual per se but also the
individual in relation to others for the sake of the common good. Thus, individuals
have a responsibility to care for people in the community as a requirement of justice.
2.2 ALMSGIVING AND CARE
Consider now the notion of care. According to one definition of care, “‘Care’…is a
felt concern for the good of others and for community with them” (Baier 1995, 48). It
is useful, however, to consider the Latin root of care, namely cura, which refers to the
notion of care for someone in need. Care for someone in need may be considered as a
kind of active care for the other. It is not surprising, then, that for Aquinas care
manifests as almsgiving, which divides into corporeal and spiritual almsdeeds. 11
Corporeal almsdeeds include meeting basic physical needs like hunger and thirst,
clothing, shelter, and companionship. Spiritual almsdeeds include prayer, education,
and fraternal correction (ST II-II q. 32, a. 2). Aquinas considers care, manifested
through almsgiving, to be morally obligatory.12
Suppose an individual commits a crime, such as stealing. In most cases,
individuals can independently identify and amend their own wrongdoings. If,
however, an individual does not amend their wrongdoing or appears untroubled by it,
10

See also ST I-II q. 96 a. 4 where he explains, “Now laws are said to be just, both from the end, when,
to wit, they ordained to the common good--and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is
made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver--and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid
on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since
one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs to the community; just
as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order to
save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are
just and binding in conscience, and are legal laws.”
11
One thing to notice according to the Latin definition of care (cura) and Thomistic manifestation of
care is that care implies action of some kind. It is not enough to simply feel concern for the other. If a
nurse simply feels concern for the patient and yet does nothing, then it is not obvious that her concern
is truly one of care. Care then connects to the active meeting of needs, whether spiritual or corporeal.
It is in this sense that lack of care manifested through almsgiving constitutes a moral sin. I am grateful
to an audience member at the Northern Texas Philosophical Society, April 2017, for bringing this to
my attention.
12
As Stump (2003) explains, “it is morally obligatory not only to relieve the material needs of the poor
but also to care for the spiritual and moral well-being of others” (333).
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Aquinas says that it is someone else’s responsibility to correct that person. He calls
this ‘fraternal correction’ and says it is morally obligatory.13
The primary aim of fraternal correction is to amend the wrongdoer; the secondary
aim is to remedy the wrongdoing itself. 14 Although there are occasions when the
obligation to correct another does not obtain, e.g., the correction would make the
wrongdoer worse, 15 on all other occasions it is a sin not to engage in fraternal
correction. In fact, Aquinas warns that a “failure to correct a sinner makes one worse
than the sinner himself” (Stump 2003, 328; ST II-II q. 33 a. 2 sed contra). He also
offers an illuminating response to an objection that reproving wrongdoers should not
be included in the list of spiritual almsdeeds. He says, “The reproof of the sinner, as
to the exercise of the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to
the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil of sin, it is an act
of mercy and lovingkindness” (ST II-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 3). This reply suggests that the
reproof involved in fraternal correction encompasses both justice and “an act of
mercy and lovingkindess.”
Based on Aquinas’s theory of justice, as ordered to the common and individual
good, and his theory of spiritual and corporeal almsgiving, Stump argues for the
integration of justice and care within Aquinas’s ethical theory. In the next section, I
consider the Confucian Puzzle, which challenges Stump’s integration thesis.
3. THE CONFUCIAN PUZZLE
There is a famous story found in Analects of Confucius that illustrates a conflict
between care and justice. It reads as follows:
The Governor of She in conversation with Confucius said, “In our village there is
someone called ‘True Person’ (zhi-gong). When his father took a sheep on the sly, he
reported him to the authorities.” Confucius replied, “Those who are true in my village
conduct themselves differently. A father covers for his son, and a son covers for his
father. And being true lies in this.” (Analects 13.18)16

In the covering version of the story supported by Confucius, the son puts filial piety
(i.e., care) for his father, along with the desire to keep the theft a secret, above the
justice that is owed to the sheep owner. Moreover, he does this even though the
13

He says, “Fraternal correction is a matter of precept” (ST II-II q. 33 a. 2ff.).
It is important to understand what primary and secondary mean. Fraternal correction requires both
correcting the wrongdoer and the wrongdoing, such that it is incomplete without both parts addressed,
so it is a mistake to think that you can choose one and not the other.
15
It is important to clarify what Aquinas means by ‘worse off.’ I take him to mean worse off with
respect to a state of injustice. The idea is that if correction creates more disintegration around the bad,
perhaps because the corrective system is in a corrupted form, then the punishment it delivers is not
serving its proper function, to re-integrate the wrongdoer around the good. The person who considers
exercising fraternal correction must also exercise prudence. See section 4.1 below.
16
Quoted in Li (2012a). Also known as ‘the father-covering-son’ story, it challenges Confucian ethics
because of their view that family relationships are the most important kind of relationship for a person
(Li 2012a, 39).
14
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owner has “better moral ground to request that the son return the sheep and at least
ask for an apology from the father” (Li 2012a, 41). The puzzle is why Confucius says
that the true (or upright) person would show partiality toward the father rather than
take a more impartial stance and turn the father in as justice requires. Confucian
scholars debate over how best to justify Confucius’s response that uprightness
requires that the son cover for the father. I consider three such arguments.17
First, the Tree Argument proposes that family love is like the root of a tree and
love for others is like the leaves and branches of the tree. Love for others or justice is
the end goal, but this end is only possible if the means are properly cultivated. Thus,
if the son covers for his father, then this act is justified because the son’s love must
not be fully mature and ready to be given to others (Li 2012a, 41-42; Wang 1996)18.18
Second, the Argument of the Whole suggests that familial love is foundational
and ultimate. Love for others comes second to the family. Thus, the son is justified
when he covers for his father because familial love is a basic moral principle that
cannot be sacrificed for justice, which is secondary (Li 2012a, 43-4; Fan 2008).
It is reasonable to think that both arguments fail to justify the son’s decision to
cover for the father. The Tree Argument fails because it cannot explain cases like a
corrupt root, the decision to sacrifice the means (i.e., family) for the greater good of
the end (i.e., others), or potential conflicts between the two foundational principles of
familial love and general love. The Argument of the Whole fails because it is not
clear that the priority of familial love entails its superiority.19
Third, the Remonstration Argument indicates that Confucius admonishes the son
to cover for his father because the ultimate goal is to remonstrate the father (Huang
2017, 20, 24-27). The best way to remonstrate father and the correct the wrongdoing
is to cover for him and help him see the wrong he has done, repent, and make amends
with the sheep owner. When Confucius says that true or upright persons cover for
each other, he is suggesting that the duty of the true, upright person is to help others
become upright as well. So, the son has a duty to make the father upright again,
which may be done through covering for him rather than turning him into the
authorities. The reason is that it is likely that turning the father in will not succeed in
remonstrating him nor will it be an act of filial piety. As Huang argues, “Since
parents normally stand to gain externally but lose internally from their wrongdoings,
we ought to remonstrate with them against such action, more for the sake of the
17

For some helpful literature discussing the Analects passage as well as additional passages in
Confucian ethics, see Huang (2007), (2015), (2017); Guo (2005); Li (2012a).
18
I find this argument very strange. What does it mean to say someone’s love is “immature”? Is the
idea that the love is inward looking rather than outward looking? Is there a point at which the son’s
love becomes mature enough so that he would choose not to cover for his father for the sake of justice?
I raise these questions only to set them aside both because the Confucian arguments are not my
immediate concern and also because Li finds them unconvincing.
19
Yong Li defends a moral partiality thesis that purports that the particular office of love between
father and son morally requires the son to cover for his father because the son desires both the good of
the father and for union with the father. See Li (2012b). I explore this idea later when I introduce the
virtue of charity.
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(internal) interest of our parents than for the sake of the (external) interest of the
potential victims of our parents’ wrongdoing” (Huang 2017, 29).
In other words, he means that the best context for helping the father become
upright is in the context of the family home, not in the context of the justice system
because the father’s internal well-being is corrected more effectively in the home.
This idea also suggests that the internal well-being of the father outweighs the
external preservation of justice by righting the wrongdoing. Finally, Huang says it is
the job of the authorities, not the son, to remedy the external wrong done by the father
by seeking out the injustice and punishing the perpetrator.
While each of these arguments for the Confucian dictum that covering is what the
‘true person’ does offer plausible responses, it is not clear that they truly resolve the
tension between filial care for the father and the relationship and the duty to uphold
justice for the common good of society. Moreover, even if Confucius offers a solution
to the puzzle, it is still instructive to consider how Aquinas might respond to the
puzzle. If it turns out that he favors one duty over the other, then we have a
counterexample to the integration thesis and his ethical system cannot overcome the
care and justice debate after all.20
3.1 THE FIRST HORN: FILIAL DUTY
The first horn of the dilemma is the care-oriented filial relation. For Aquinas,
honoring parents is a precept. He says, “Now to our parents, of all our neighbors, we
are under the greatest obligation” (ST II-II q. 122 a. 5). Duty to parents is something
owed to them in two ways. We owe our parents essentially, or directly, by giving
reverence and service to them as such (ST II-II q. 101 a. 1). For example, we owe
them reverence as inferiors to superiors. We also owe our parents accidentally or with
respect to something else. For example, we owe them support if they are poor and
company if they are sick. By visiting them and providing for them, we thereby honor
and respect them. Aquinas also states that duty and homage are not given equally to
all but chiefly to our parents and to others according to our means and their own
claims (ST II-II q. 101 a. 1). Aquinas allows the duty to parents to be forsaken only if
it keeps a person from giving God His due (ST II-II q. 101 a. 4).
Aquinas also suggests that the ‘debt of being’ owed to parents mirrors the ‘debt of
being owed to God’, who is both Father and Creator of all things (ST II-II q. 101 a. 1).
Aquinas states that we regard those who are connected to us more than those who are
20

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in greater depth the Confucian ethical
system, it would be an interesting project to compare the two ethical systems of Confucius and
Aquinas. Additionally, looking at the puzzle from the lens of moral particularity would also be
instructive. One question to consider is whether the Thomistic and Confucian ethical systems endorse
a particularist view of morality. One reason to think this is because they seem to give significant
weight to the contextual and relational aspects of moral dilemmas in order to decide what to do.
Morality requires that a person be sensitive and attuned to the contextual and relational aspects of the
situation in order to make the best decision. The particularist position contrasts with moral generalist
position, which maintains that there are general principles that guide all ethical decisions in any
context.
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not and that natural union is prior to and more stable than other unions (ST II-II q. 26
a. 6). These passages illustrate the high value Aquinas places on family relations over
other relations. The relation between father and son resembles our relation to God and
in this respect is critical to maintain. So perhaps, given these requirements of duty,
obligation, and respect to parents, Aquinas will take the first horn of the dilemma and
say that the son ought to put care for his father over showing justice toward the
person wronged by the father. On the other hand, given what Aquinas says about
justice and the common good, this conclusion is suspect.
3.2 THE SECOND HORN: DUTY OF JUSTICE
The second horn of the dilemma is the justice relation. It supports the restoration of
justice to the wronged individual and the assurance that the father receives proper
punishment. Recall that justice implies a certain kind of equality. Theft is an action
that creates an inequality between parties and thus it is an injustice. As Aquinas says,
“because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for
this reason theft is contrary to justice, wrongdoing of theft itself.” Aquinas maintains
the commandment in Exodus which says, “Thou shall not steal” and says that every
theft is a sin (ST II-II q. 66 a. 6).
Moreover, Aquinas insists not only that the inequality toward the wronged
individual must be righted but also that the sin of injustice must be corrected in the
father. Notice two interrelated consequences that result from the injustice: (i) there is
the break in relation between two people in the community, and (ii) there is a stain on
the soul of the father. So, when the son considers whether he should turn his father
into the authorities, justice obligates him to right the wrong done by his father toward
the individual and to enable the due punishment for his father. One way to think about
punishment is in terms of a part-whole relation. In his discussion on murder, Aquinas
says the following:
Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is
naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason, we observe that if the health of the
whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to
the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away.
Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole.
Therefore, if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some
sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the
common good. (ST II-II q. 64 a. 2)

This passage indicates that it is permissible for the son to turn in his father for the
sake of the whole community where the wronged individual is a representative part.21

21

Suppose the son decides to be a martyr and bear the father’s guilt for him by turning himself into the
authorities rather than the father. Against this objection, Aquinas states in his discussion on
punishment for sin that a son may not bear the iniquity of the father (ST II-II q. 87ff).
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It is possible, then, that in accordance with justice and impartiality, Aquinas will
embrace the second horn of the dilemma and require the son to turn in his father to be
justly punished.
Another consideration is relevant with respect to the circumstances in which a
person might give preference to either care or justice. In his discussion of piety and
the virtue of charity, Aquinas makes a distinction between different forms of love
relevant to circumstance. The forms of love relate to kin, comrades in war, and civil
society. So, even though we have natural ties to love our kin, there are other
considerations that also take effect. Aquinas replies thus to the question asked about
loving those connected to us by blood:
As stated above (Article 7), we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely
united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and because there are
more reasons for loving them…in comparing love to love we should compare one union
with another….Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred
most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellowcitizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. (ST II-II q. 26 a.8)

Perhaps then, the circumstances relevant for the son’s decision are those of the
community insofar as the injustice was done outside of the family. If this is correct,
then it is possible that justice toward the wronged individual takes priority over the
son’s duty to his father and therefore Aquinas would require the son to turn in the
father to the authorities and prioritize the impartial, justice perspective over the
partial, familial perspective.22
Because Aquinas indicates that an individual wrongdoer can and should be
punished for the sake of the communal good together with the fact that an unrepented, un-righted wrongdoing is both unjust and a mortal sin, it looks like he
prioritizes justice over care.23 Thus, we have a counterexample to Stump’s integration
proposal.
22

There is another interpretation one may give to this passage. Perhaps the notion of loving more
intensely those who are more closely united to us makes it obviously the case that the son has a duty to
cover for his father, in virtue of their close family relation. It likely is the case that the son is more
closely united to the father than he is to the sheep owner. So, the son ought to love his father more
intensely, which implies that he should cover for his father out of intense love. In response, I would
argue that even if it is the case that the son is closer to his father and has more intense love for his
father, it doesn’t follow that he would cover for the father. To see why this is the case, think about the
nature of love. Imagine two young children are misbehaving by hitting each other. One child is yours
and the other is the neighbor’s child. You love your child more intensely than the neighbor’s child
because the child your own. Now, the love for your child should motivate you to discipline her for her
naughty behavior in a more severe way than you should discipline your neighbor’s child. One reason
for this is that you love your child so much that you do not want her to be integrated around the bad,
i.e., unjustly hitting the other child. You desire that your child be made right with respect to the
injustice precisely because you love your child and desire her good. Thus, intense love does not detract
from intense justice.
23
Someone might object that there is good evidence for prioritizing care over justice and so my
suggestion that justice trumps care in Aquinas’s ethics is mistaken. One example is to consider what
Aquinas says about equality and justice and what he says about the inequality between son and father
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In the next section, I argue that the priority of justice over care does not actually
provide a counterexample to Stump’s integration thesis. To show why this is the case
requires a discussion of charity. By considering the unifying virtue of charity, it is
possible to show that love actually unifies justice and care in an inseparable way such
that the son, by turning the father in, actually demonstrates both care and justice
simultaneously.
4. UNIFYING LOVE

One of the crucial differences between Thomistic and Aristotelian virtue ethics is
Aquinas’s three-fold division of the virtues into moral, intellectual, and theological.
In particular, the virtue of charity is included in the definition of all the other virtues
and is that on which all the virtues depend (ST II-II q. 23 a. 4 ad. 1).24 Aquinas thinks
there is no true virtue without charity. He distinguishes between true virtue and
counterfeit virtue as well as perfect and imperfect virtue. For example, he thinks that
a virtue aimed at a particular good that only appears good but is not actually good is
not a genuine virtue. Moreover, a virtue aimed at a true good that lacks charity is a
true virtue but not a perfect virtue. So he says, “no strictly [perfect] true virtue is
possible without charity” (ST II-II q. 23 a. 7).
Moral virtue is a habit of the will that disposes the will to choose according to
reason (Stump 2003, 76); but, for Aquinas, no moral virtue, even one chosen
according to prudence or right reason, can be perfect or complete without charity.
Even the habit of justice cannot be perfect or complete without charity. Thus, justice
without charity is not true justice even if it is aimed at the true good. Suppose the son
turns in his father to the authorities to be punished. If his sole aim is to ensure
punishment, then it is not true justice.25 If, however, the son turns his father into the
authorities because he loves his father and desires the good for his father, then it is
true justice that integrates doing the right action with the right intention.
(ST II-II q. 57 a. 4). Given his view on the inequality between son and father, it is possible that this
unequal relation prevents the son from turning in his father as justice requires for equals. Notice
though that even if this is correct and there is more evidence in favor of care than in favor of justice, it
remains a counterexample to Stump’s proposal. Insofar as she says he integrates care and justice,
favoring one or the other still remains problematic. I am grateful to Kevin Cutright (personal
communication, April 2016) for pressing me on this point.
24
Charity is a kind of love that is specifically love of God and love of goodness. Aquinas says, “Now
the proper object of love is the good, as stated above (ST I-II q. 27 a.1 corpus), so that wherever there
is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the
object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of
that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore, charity is a special virtue” (ST II-II q. 23 a. 4). Unless
specified, I use love in its more general sense, which Aquinas explains is a twofold tendency “towards
the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he
wishes some good” (ST I-II q. 26 a. 4).
25
It is not true justice because it lacks charity, but also because the intentions are not right. Justice does
not seek punishment for its end, but the good for the other, which requires restoring equality. Aquinas
says, “justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so
that justice is somewhat the good of another person” (ST II-II q. 58 a.12).
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What kind of good might the son desire for his father? Recall that for Aquinas
injustice is a sin and a break in a relationship between an individual and the
community and between an individual and God. Since injustice remains in the sinner
until he repents of it and is made right in some way, the son who does not turn his
father in is in a sense preventing the father from restoring the broken relationship.
Ideally, the father would turn himself in, perhaps with the encouragement of his
son. Suppose that the son encourages this and his father refuses, then when the son
turns him in, he is acting with a kind of loving severity that seeks the restoration of
his father’s relationship with the community and with God. In this respect, he is
exercising his obligation of fraternal correction. Even though he has a duty qua son to
care for and respect his father, 26 he also has a duty qua person to correct the
wrongdoing in the person who is also his father. This act of correction manifests a
kind of care and respect for his father that upholds justice.
4.1 A WORRY AND A RESPONSE
Yong Li worries about this conclusion. In fact, he argues for the opposite conclusion,
namely, that love requires that the son cover for his father. He argues:
In the covering case, if what the father did is wrong, but turning the father into the
authorities is not the right way to reform him, then the son should not turn his father into
the authorities. If the son loves his father, then the son should desire the good of his
father and desire union with the father. If turning his father into the authorities is not
good for him, and if the son does something that is not good for his father, then it would
damage the mutual closeness between the son and the father. Therefore, turning the father
into the authorities violates the son’s love of the father. (Li, 2012b, 139; my emphasis)

While I am sympathetic to this argument, I offer two responses that challenge its
conclusion.
First, notice that Yong Li makes a conditional claim about turning in the father.
He says that that the son should not turn in his father if “it is not the right way to
reform him.” Notice the connection this claim has with Aquinas’s condition for
fraternal correction, namely, if correcting the wrongdoer makes the wrongdoer worse
off, then there is not an obligation to correct them. The challenge for the son is to
decide whether or not turning in the father really is the best way to correct him. So, if
the justice system is corrupt and would have no intention of justly correcting the
wrongdoer, then the son should not turn in the father. If, however, the justice system
is functioning as it should, then the son should turn in his father. Here, the virtue of
prudence is necessary for the son to exercise.27
26

Another duty to consider is that of obedience. Perhaps the son has a duty qua son to obey his father
in virtue of filial piety. It is not clear to me how obedience would fit into this case. The story as told
does not indicate that the son would disobey the father by turning him into the authorities. Unless the
father orders the son not to turn him in, then why think there is a duty of obedience at issue here?
27
I am grateful to a reviewer for bringing the importance of prudence to my attention.
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Prudence is the virtue that “aims to apply right reason to action” (ST II-II q.47 a.5,
reply). Prudence is also the virtue concerned with contingent things, so it involves
deliberation about which means to take for attaining a particular end. Moreover, it is
important to understand that prudence is not the virtue that appoints the end to the
moral virtues, but rather, it regulates the means. There are several implications for the
case that follow from these points. First, the son needs the virtue of prudence to
determine what the best means are for fraternal correction. The goal is the same –
namely, to right the wrongdoer and amend the wrongdoing, but the means can vary
depending on the situation. Second, insofar as we accept the unity of the virtues thesis
in Aquinas, if the son has the virtues of charity and justice, then he also has the virtue
of prudence. So, acting out of love for his father and with the desire for justice, the
son will also act according to prudence.
Second, I propose that it is possible to both desire the good of the father and union
with the father and turn in the father due to the nature of wrongdoing and the internal
division that occurs within a person who sins. On my reading, turning in the father to
the authorities is one way to reform him because it serves as an act of fraternal
correction, which is one way to demonstrate care for the father. 28 It sacrifices an
immediate good – maintaining proximate closeness and relationship, for a future good
– the reconciliation of the father that facilitates union and closeness with God, the
sheep owner, and the son (at least potentially). This outcome is something that is lost
if the son covers for him. Even if it is possible for the son and father to discuss the
wrongdoing in order to reconcile the father to an upright state, there still needs to be
justice made to the sheep-owner. And this may include the father making amends to
the wronged party by being punished or fined, etc.29
One way to see this act of justice as a manifestation of care and respect is to
consider the twofold nature of justice. Insofar as justice is a virtue, it is a habit or
disposition toward the good, and it is something that an individual cultivates within
herself; however, the nature of justice is also such that it takes the individual beyond
her own pursuit of excellence and relates her in certain ways toward others. As
Stephen Chanderbahn says, “Establishing and cementing the habit of justice within an
individual entail [sic] one coming to habitually render unto each what is right for each
for the sake of a person’s coming to attain his or her true good” (Chanderbahn 2013,
283). Since the true good for the father includes being made right with respect to the
injustice committed, the son is helping the father attain this good by turning him in to
the authorities.
28

Notice I suggest this decision in as one possibility, not the only possibility. As I expand more below,
prudence will be present in the son’s decision. Because charity unites the virtues, then if the son truly
is acting according to charity, he will be acting with prudence and with justice as well. The point,
however, of my reading is to see how Aquinas can bring justice and care together, and turning the
father in is one way they do come together through fraternal correction.
29
I think the same argument applies to Huang’s proposal that the son remonstrate the father by
covering for him rather than by turning him into the authorities. The problem I see with this suggestion
is that it is not clear how justice and care is also shown to the sheep owner. The challenge for any
response to the justice and care tension is to account for as much as possible in the proposed solution.
The Thomistic solution I offer accounts for justice and care owed to the father and to the sheep-owner.
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If we reflect on the nature of love, the true good becomes clear. As Stump
explains, love consists in two mutually governing desires, namely the desire for the
good of the beloved and the desire for union with the Beloved (Stump 2012, 2). Both
of these desires are manifest in the son’s choice to uphold justice. The son loves his
father with the first desire because he wants his father to be without sin and to be
made right with respect to justice. He also desires that his father be reunited in love to
God and to his community.30
Notice also that the son’s desire for union with his father is also satisfied. It is
satisfied because only when the father himself is made right with respect to the
injustice will he be able to be united in love with his son. Insofar as sin creates
distance between persons, when the father receives correction for his wrongdoing, the
distance-creating sin of injustice is removed making union possible with the son.
Thus, by turning his father in, the son both cares for his father by facilitating all of
these goods (i.e., the father is made right from sin and thus can be united with God,
others, and his son again) and also upholds the requirements of justice (i.e., turns his
father in for proper punishment and enables amends to be made to the sheep owner).
Finally, recall the challenge raised against theories of care that the individual
care-giver risks sacrificing herself for the sake of the care relation. The difficulty is
how to account for the individual’s personal preferences, desires, and interests as well
as her relations of care and concern for others. Notice that justice applies both to an
individual and to her relations with others. Even though Aquinas says that an
individual is obligated to care for others through various forms of almsgiving,
Aquinas also thinks that an individual is never required to give up what is necessary
for life. Thus, since love is essential for living a good, even just life, and only
someone who has a true sense of self can give herself in love to another, then part of
30

It is interesting to consider a situation in which justice is done in the name of love, but the recipient
of justice has sincerely repented and mended his ways. For example, in The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan
is talking with Aloysha about a pamphlet translated from French that tells the story of a murderer,
Richard, who was only 23 years old when he was executed at the guillotine for his crime. It happens
that he repented and converted to Christianity. He not only admitted his wrongdoing, but repented and
told the court that although he was a monster, God had shown him grace. The villagers embraced him
as brother while insisting that he “die in the Lord” for he had “shed blood and must die…. Die, brother,
die in the Lord, for even thou hast found grace!” (Dostoyevsky, Part II, Book 5, Chapter 4, 262-3).
They covered him in kisses and dragged him to the scaffold to be decapitated. The irony here is that
justice is done ‘in the name of brotherly love’; yet, this kind of love seems almost repulsive.
This case is interesting because it highlights a further tension that arises when the wrongdoer
sincerely repents and yet there is still injustice. How does repentance, forgiveness, reconciliation, and
punishment fit into the justice, care, and love framework? It highlights the attention that must be given
to the intention of justice when done in love and the desire of love itself. The nature of the crime
requires severe punishment, but the nature of the repentance also ameliorates the internal state of the
wrongdoer. So, does the internal state of the wrongdoer made right to justice eliminate the need for
external justice for the crime? How is this done in love? I raise these questions only to set them aside
for later discussion. In the case at hand in the Confucian Puzzle, we do not know if the father has
repented, and part of the solution is to help right the internal disintegration in the father, which is
already present in Richard. (I am grateful to an audience member at the Pacific APA, April 2017, for
this example.)
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living a good life is to have a sense of identity and self-worth that is not enveloped by
others. As I have argued, the unifying virtue of charity shows how Stump’s
integration thesis withstands the challenge raised against it by the Confucian Puzzle.
Ultimately, Aquinas’s moral theory offers a solution to the Confucian Puzzle because
it presupposes the inclusion of care in truly virtuous acts of justice ordered to their
proper end through the virtue of charity.
5.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Aquinas has the resources to resolve the tension present between
justice and care manifested in the Confucian Puzzle. Because of the overarching
virtue of charity, true justice is such that it must show care through charity. For
Aquinas, there is no true conflict between justice and care because by acting justly,
the son acts with care in virtue of acting from love for his father. Moreover, the son
also acts with care and concern for the wronged individual by showing him justice,
which adds another layer of depth to Aquinas’s account. As I have argued, the
unifying virtue of charity shows how it is possible for the integration of justice and
care to obtain. Thus, although it appears that Aquinas faces an uncomfortable
dilemma when confronted with the Confucian Puzzle, it turns out that his account
deals better with the puzzle than critics previously grasped because his account
presupposes the inclusion of care in truly virtuous acts of justice ordered to their
proper end through the virtue of charity
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